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Spinoza’s curious defense of toleration
Justin Steinberg
A little more than fifteen years ago an exchange between David West
and Isaiah Berlin concerning Spinoza’s “positive conception of liberty”
was published in Political Studies. West aimed to rescue Spinoza from
Berlin’s procrustean critique of positive liberty by pointing to liberal fea-
tures of Spinoza’s thought, such as his methodological individualism and
his defense of toleration. Berlin’s response toWest seems to reveal an embar-
rassing lack of familiarity with these liberal features of Spinoza’s thought.1
He claims that, according to Spinoza, “the obstacles to rational thought
must be removed . . . all irrationality, heteronomy, passion, which resist or
darken reason, must be removed, or at the very least controlled, by rational
self understanding, education and also legislation – that is, if necessary, the
sanction of force, of coercive action.”2 There can be no question that Berlin is
largely mistaken about this last point.3 However, Berlin’s mischaracteriza-
tion raises an interesting question: why exactly doesn’t Spinoza think that
we should attempt to snuff out irrationality and dissolution with the law’s
iron fist?
In this chapter I take seriously the force of this question. I will intensify
the problem in the first section below by noting several features of Spinoza’s
thought that lead him to eschew skeptical, pluralistic, and rights-based
arguments for toleration, and make his defense of toleration even more
surprising. I follow this by delineating the prudential, anticlerical roots of
Spinoza’s defense, before turning – in the final section – to consider just how
far and when toleration serves the guiding norms of governance, namely,
1 Berlin’s treatment of Spinoza in “Two Concepts of Liberty” and elsewhere is careless at best. We
ought thus to be suspicious of Delahunty’s claim that “no student of Spinoza has done more to
illuminate [the relationship between knowledge and freedom] than Isaiah Berlin” (Spinoza, p. 256).
2 Berlin, “A Reply,” p. 298, my emphasis.
3 After all, Spinoza insists that most legislative attempts to make men wise and temperate are futile,
at best. See for instance his claim that “simplicity and truth of mind are not instilled in men by the
power of laws or by public authority, absolutely no one can be compelled to be happy [beatus] by
force of law” (TTP Ch. 7; G iii 116).
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peace and positive liberty. Once we see how toleration is anchored in
these norms, we form a clearer picture of Spinoza as a liberal perfectionist
for whom the bounds of political toleration depend on pragmatic and
circumstance-specific assessments of what conduces to the flourishing of
the state. This will help to illuminate what is peculiar – and, arguably,
commendable – about Spinoza’s form of liberalism.
1 the roads not taken
1.1 Why toleration must be justified
It has often been noted that there is something rather odd about the
very idea of toleration. We may follow D. D. Raphael here in describing
toleration as “species of allowing liberty . . . [that] implies that you really
disapprove of what you are prepared to leave alone.”4 It seems to involve
at least following three conditions:
(1) One disapproves of another’s activity.
(2) One is capable of, or at least one believes oneself to be capable of,
preventing such activity.
(3) One allows – that is, refrains from attempting to prevent – such activity.
What makes toleration odd is that it is not apparent why one should not
seek to prevent activities of which one disapproves when one is capable,
or believes oneself to be capable, of doing so. This becomes a full-blown
paradox if one assumes that to disapprove of something is to think that it
should be prevented, since toleration would then imply adopting a policy
of not preventing that which one believes should be prevented.5
Moreover, even if we deny that there is anything paradoxical about
toleration, it must be admitted that toleration does not justify itself. On the
face of it, it would seem that, other things being equal, one ought to prevent
activities of which one disapproves, especially when the consequences of
not doing so are thought to be significant. In other words, intolerance
would seem to be the default position. It is toleration, then, that stands in
need of justification. So how does one justify this, arguably queer, practice?6
4 Raphael, “The Intolerable,” p. 139. 5 See Mendus, “Introduction,” p. 4.
6 In what follows I will be exclusively examining philosophical, rather than religious, arguments for
toleration. The most prominent Dutch advocates of toleration in the seventeenth century – from
Dirck Coornhert and the Arminians in the early part of the century to the Collegiants and other
heterodox Christians of mid-century – based their arguments for toleration primarily on scriptural
grounds (see Israel, “The Intellectual Debate,” and Kossmann, “Freedom”). Indeed, Spinoza himself
offers a sort of religious argument for toleration when he uses his interpretation of Scripture to show
that philosophy and faith have separate domains, thereby undercutting the grounds for religious
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1.2 The argument from epistemic humility
One natural way to defend the practice of toleration is to point to the
fact that we are cognitively limited and prone to mistakes. Because of our
fallibility, we ought to avoid dictating how others should live.7 Let us call
this the argument from epistemic humility. The extreme, fallibilist version
of this view claims that any one of our beliefs could turn out to be false. But
one need not embrace this position to make an argument from epistemic
modesty for religious toleration, since even if there are some firm, self-
justifying beliefs, beliefs about, for instance, what is necessary for salvation
are not likely to be among them. Because we are liable to make mistakes
concerning the nature of the divinity and what is required for salvation,
we ought to refrain from imposing such highly fallible beliefs on others,
lest we suppress the true religion. Epistemic humility is also often cited
in defense of tolerating the ethical beliefs and practices of others. Indeed,
SusanMendus has argued that “twentieth-century liberalism . . . frequently
bases its commitment to toleration on moral skepticism.”8
The argument from epistemic humility was in relatively wide circulation
in the early modern period. Many classical skeptical texts, including the
works of Sextus Empiricus, had been rediscovered in the sixteenth century,
providing philosophers with a new set of tools for combating various
forms of dogmatism. During this same period, wars of religion were being
waged throughout Europe. It is no surprise, then, that as political thinkers
sought ways to resolve religious disputes, skepticism was often used as an
instrument for toleration.9 The works of Castellio and Montaigne, for
instance, contain examples of how skepticism might be invoked in support
of toleration.10
persecution. In focusing on philosophical arguments, then, I do not wish to downplay the role of
religious arguments in the history of tolerationist thought.
7 Epistemic humility, or moral skepticism of the sort I am referring to, is to be distinguished from
moral non-cognitivism. Moral non-cognitivism – which claims that moral judgments do not have
any cognitive content or truth value – does not give one an obvious reason to refrain from imposing
one’s own non-cognitive judgments on others. The recognition that one’s own judgments are not
factual would not necessarily undermine one’s commitment to these very attitudes. See Harrison,
“Relativism and Toleration.”
8 Mendus, “Introduction,” p. 2.
9 It should be noted that, as Richard Tuck has so effectively pointed out, skepticism in the early
modern period did not always support toleration (“Skepticism and Toleration”). It often supported
acquiescence to an intolerant authority.
10 In Concerning Heretics, Castellio argues that “dissensions arise solely from ignorance of the truth”
(p. 132). It is folly, therefore, to persecute others on the basis of something that we ourselves do not
understand. And Montaigne, in Des Boiteux (“Of Cripples”), argues that “to kill men, we should
have sharp and luminous evidence” (Essays, p. 789) – evidence that Montaigne believes that we
quite obviously lack.
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But however popular this mode of argument was, it is clear that Spinoza’s
defense of toleration is not grounded on epistemic humility. Indeed, one
can hardly imagine a less skeptical philosopher when it comes to our
knowledge of God’s nature and of the prescripts of ethics.11 The geometric
method deployed in the Ethics give us demonstrative proof that there is
only one substance,12 God or Nature (Deus sive Natura), that everything
that exists exists in and through God,13 that everything follows from the
necessity of God’s nature,14 that nature never acts for the sake of some end,15
and so forth. These tenets, like all truths of reason, are self-certifying; once
grasped, they lie beyond doubt.16 The same can be said of the dictates of
reason, or the ethical prescriptions, that Spinoza presents in Ethics Part 4,
and the cognitive therapy that he lays out in Ethics Part 5. The geometric
method leaves no room for skepticism or epistemic humility concerning
these matters. So, however common skeptical arguments were in the early
modern period, it should be apparent that Spinoza rejects them.17
1.3 The argument from pluralism
An argument that is sometimes conflatedwith the argument from epistemic
humility is the argument from pluralism. Unlike the skeptic, the pluralist
does not necessarily claim that we cannot know the truth about religion
or morality; rather, the pluralist claims that there is not a single truth
about religion or morality. Strictly speaking, the pluralist does not offer an
argument for toleration, since she does not think that activities that deviate
from her own conception of what is good necessarily warrant disapproval.
Thus, condition (1) from the above account does not necessarily obtain.
Nevertheless, since the pluralist whom we will be discussing presents a case
against intolerance, we may regard her as a tolerationist, at least in a loose
sense.
Pluralism is sometimes presented as an argument for religious toleration.
Gary Remer, for instance, portrays Bodin’s defense of toleration in the
11 See Popkin, History of Scepticism, pp. 229–248.
12 E1p14. 13 E1p15. 14 E1p29. 15 E1app. 16 E2p43s.
17 Ultimately, we can imagine Spinoza regarding the argument from epistemic humility as too weak.
His account helps to point out thatmost religious conflicts of the day were based on a confusion. The
anthropomorphic, providential conception of God that undergirds and animates religious schisms
does not exist; immaterial, immortal souls that provide the foundation for disputes about salvation
do not exist. The views that drive persecution are not just probably false, they are demonstrably
false. So, while the argument from epistemic humility allows the possibility that the intolerationist/
persecutor may be right, even if his beliefs are not justified, on Spinoza’s account, the intolerationist’s
beliefs are both false and unjustified.
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Colloquium as grounded in religious pluralism: the truth about religion is
notmonistic, it is “complex” and “multifaceted.”18 The full truth, according
to Bodin, can only be ascertained through the expression of a diversity of
perspectives.19 More often, though, pluralism is invoked in the service of
moral toleration. John StuartMill’sOnLiberty contains perhaps the greatest
expression of moral pluralism. In this work Mill, under the influence of
Wilhelm von Humboldt, makes an impassioned plea for “experiments in
living” and the individual pursuit of happiness. Part of his defense of liberty
hinges on his belief that there is no single blueprint for a good human life:
“Human nature is not a machine to be built after a model, and set to do
exactly the work prescribed for it, but a tree, which requires to grow and
develop itself on all sides, according to the tendency of the inward forces
which make it a living thing.”20
However, at best, pluralism just shows that we should not interfere with
others’ affairs just because they run counter to our conception of a good
life. But a pluralist might have independent reasons for preventing certain
activities, for instance if they fall outside of the range of acceptable activities
for anyone, or if securing a certain degree of uniformity would have salutary
social consequences. In order, then, to move from pluralism to toleration,
we need an additional argument. One such argument, offered by Mill,
would be to claim that we stand in a privileged – though not infallible –
epistemic position when it comes to determining what a good life consists
in for us.21 The state cannot hope to be in as good a position to determine
how we ought to live as we are, so it ought not to restrict our choices, at
least in matters that concern only ourselves.22
Having suggested how pluralism could be used to support toleration,
we may now consider whether Spinoza himself argues in this manner. To
answer this question, we must first ask whether Spinoza was, in fact, a plu-
ralist. Some recent commentators think so. For instance, Steven B. Smith
has argued that Spinoza rejects a “monistic view of human flourishing, the
one-size-fits-all model of the good life. Instead his awareness of diversity
18 Remer, “Bodin’s Pluralistic Theory,” p. 121.
19 One could read Gotthold Lessing’s Nathan the Wise, published in 1779, nearly two centuries after
the completion of Bodin’s Colloquium in 1588, as advancing a similar version of religious pluralism.
The famous ring parable in this work seems to exhort us to give up the notion of one true faith and
to allow that a plurality of faiths may have legitimate claims to truth.
20 Mill, On Liberty, p. 56.
21 See Mill’s claims that “with respect to his own feelings and circumstance the most ordinary man or
woman has means of knowledge immeasurably surpassing those that can be possessed by anyone
else” (On Liberty, p. 71).
22 Admittedly, this is, on its own, a rather weak argument for toleration.
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both within and between human beings . . . makes the Ethics an impor-
tant, although frequently unacknowledged, source of moral pluralism.”23
And David West, in his attempt to save Spinoza from Berlin’s critique,
highlights what he regards as Spinoza’s pluralism,24 citing it as one of the
primary grounds for toleration: “the outcome of a rationalized conatus
is potentially different for every individual and understanding must be
exercised by everyone for themselves, so no one can justifiably impose their
interpretation of virtue or the good life on one another.”25
Smith and West ground their interpretation of Spinoza as a moral plu-
ralist on the fact that we each have distinct and complex bodies, with our
own ratios of motion and rest, which will lead us to express our striving in
unique ways.What preserves and empowers your body/mindmay be rather
different from what preserves and empowers mine, a point that Spinoza
makes in the scholium to E4p45:
It is the part of a wise man, I say, to refresh and restore himself in moderation
with pleasant food and drink, with scents, with the beauty of green plants, with
decoration, music, sports, the theater, and other things of this kind, which anyone
can use without injury to another. For the human body is composed of a greatmany
parts of different natures which constantly require new and varied nourishment.26
While it is evident that Spinoza does think that sensual pleasures and
diversions can contribute to one’s power of acting, and that he accepts that
these restorative sources of pleasure and amusement often vary from person
to person, it is far less evident what follows from this.
If moral pluralism amounts to no more than the claim that there is some
variation in what contributes in some way to the flourishing of individu-
als, it would be a trivial doctrine that seemingly everyone in the history
of philosophy accepts. However, I presume that moral pluralism claims
that the central features of one’s flourishing may vary significantly between
individuals and that the sources of value between individuals are incom-
mensurable. If this is the case, it is not at all clear that Spinoza would
qualify as a pluralist.
For Spinoza, the basic contours of a fully active, flourishing life are the
same for all humans. Blessedness, or one’s highest flourishing, is achieved
when one comes to understand things through God’s essence, resulting in
an intellectual love of God.27 The content of this knowledge is the same for
everyone. Flourishing also consists in gaining intellectual control over one’s
23 Smith, Spinoza’s Book of Life, p. 149. 24 West, “Spinoza on Positive Freedom,” p. 292.
25 West, “Spinoza on Positive Freedom,” p. 296; my emphasis. 26 E4p45s; G ii 244.
27 E5p32c ff.
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affects28 and in acting from reason.29 While it is true that the measures that
are taken to acquire this knowledge and gain control over oneself may vary
a bit between individuals,30 the actual rational control that is gained is the
same for everyone. Moreover, whatever differences exist between human
beings, Spinoza insists that human beings share a rational essence.31 For
these reasons, it seems that, pace West, Berlin might actually be right
in characterizing Spinoza as a monist about truth and goodness; while the
procedures for becoming rational and virtuous may be narrowly pluralistic,
reason itself, and the virtues themselves, are universal.32 And even if one
admits that the sources of restorative pleasures vary from person to person,
the sources of the most durable and important forms of joy are the same
for all humans. And, finally, even if there is a meaningful and important
sense in which Spinoza is a pluralist, he seems to have no sympathy for
the epistemic privilege view advanced by Mill that would enable him to
use this pluralism in defense of tolerationism. So, even if Spinoza were a
pluralist, which I have suggested he is not, this position does not appear to
play a role in his defense of toleration in the TTP.33
1.4 The argument from rights
Some have supposed that any satisfactory theory of toleration must be
able to show not just that intolerance is impractical or harmful in certain
28 Spinoza provides a digest of how such control is achieved in E5p20s. 29 E4p18s ff.
30 Spinoza indicates in E5p10s that gaining control over one’s affects requires habituation, and one’s
regimen must be tailored to one’s own proclivities, e.g., “if someone sees that he pursues esteem too
much, he should think of its correct use” (E5p10s).
31 See, e.g., E4p35 and its attendant corollaries and scholia.
32 This same reasoning could be applied to the response that Spinoza gave to his landlady when asked
if he believed that she could find salvation in her religion (reported by Colerus), which was: “your
Religion is a good one, you need not look for any other, nor doubt that you may be saved in it,
provided, whilst you apply yourself to Piety, you live at the same time a peaceable and quiet life”
(Colerus, Life, p. 41). Let’s assume that Spinoza was not being ironic here. On the face of it, the
suggestion that salvation could come through leading a good Christian life rather than through
Spinozism appears to betray a pluralism that leads Spinoza to tolerate the beliefs of his landlady. But
I think a more plausible reading requires noting that for Spinoza salvation (salus) may be a graduated
concept: it comes in degrees. Spinoza has simply calculated that (1) his landlady already leads a
relatively peaceful, content life, and (2) her tranquillity would likely be disturbed by Spinozism.
Her best hope of maximizing her power of acting, then, lies in maintaining her religion rather than
trying to become a Spinozist.
33 The closest that he comes to offering an argument from pluralism occurs in the preface to the work,
where he writes: “as men’s ways of thinking vary considerably and different beliefs are better suited
to different men . . . everyone should be allowed freedom of judgment and the right to interpret the
basic tenets of his faith as he thinks fit” (TTP Preface, p. 7). If we examine this passage in context,
however, it is clear that all he is saying is that different people will be moved to obedience on the
basis of different beliefs; so we ought not to worry about people’s beliefs, provided that they are
obedient to the state.
Spinoza’s curious defense of toleration 217
circumstances, but further that it is wrong, full stop.34 Perhaps the most
plausible way of providing a principled defense of toleration is to show that
intolerance is a violation of the rights of individuals. If it can be shown that
at least certain freedoms are actually rights – i.e., “political trumps held
by individuals,” to use Ronald Dworkin’s formulation35 – then it will be
apparent that any attempt at scotching these liberties will be intrinsically
and absolutely wrong.
In the opening paragraph of the TTP, Chapter 20 Spinoza appears to
appeal to something like a right-based defense of freedom of thought or
conscience, writing: “any sovereign power appears to harm its subjects
and usurp their rights when it tries to tell them what they must accept
as true and reject as false.”36 Michael Rosenthal has suggested that this
passage reveals a significant juridical dimension to Spinoza’s defense of
toleration.37 However, if there is indeed a juridical component to Spinoza’s
defense, it must be, as Rosenthal himself recognizes, a rather peculiar one,
since Spinoza’s notion of right (ius) is itself deeply peculiar.
Spinoza rejects traditional normative conceptions of right (ius). For
instance, he explicitly rejects Grotius’s notion of right as “a moral Quality
annexed to the Person, enabling him to have, or do, something justly.”38
Grotius is here advancing the notion of a subjective right – to have a right is
to have a title to something, which entails that others have corresponding
duties to respect this right. If this were the sense of right that Spinoza
is using in Chapter 20, then one could reasonably conclude that he has
principled, normative grounds for opposing toleration. However, Spinoza
consciously rejects the notion of right as title. Instead, he adopts the view
that one’s right is coextensive with one’s power (TTP, Chapter 16).39 The
whole aim of Spinoza’s analysis of right (ius) in Chapter 16 is to eviscerate
traditional, normative conceptions of rights, rather than to propound a
new theory. Once we recognize that the bounds of our power fix the limits
of our right, we can see that the reason that the sovereign should not seek to
34 For instance, Mendus claims that it is a mark against an account of toleration if it only shows that
intolerance is imprudent rather than morally wrong (“Introduction,” pp. 2–3).
35 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, p. xi.
36 TTP Ch. 20; G iii 239.
37 Rosenthal, “Spinoza’s Republican Argument,” pp. 330 and 333. Rosenthal adds that “the impor-
tance of this point, that belief cannot be compelled, cannot be overstated” (“Spinoza’s Republican
Argument,” p. 332).
38 Grotius, Rights, i.i.4. This is one of three senses of right (ius) for Grotius. The other two are
“that which may be done without Injustice” (i.i.3) and “the Rule and Dictate of Right Reason,
shewing the Moral Deformity or Moral Necessity there is in any Act, according to its Suitableness
or Unsuitableness to a reasonable Nature” (i.10).
39 For a helpful discussion of this point, see Curley, “Kissinger, Spinoza, and Genghis Khan.”
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regulate the minds of its subjects is simply that it does not have the power
to do so, for “it is impossible for one person’s mind to be absolutely under
another’s control.”40 The argument, then, amounts to this: one cannot
entirely control another’s mind, so to attempt to do so is to attempt to do
something impossible, which is irrational.41
Even leaving aside the peculiarities of Spinoza’s conception of right, there
are reasons to think that Spinoza’s “argument from rights” is not especially
strong, certainly not strong enough to support the level of toleration that
he advocates. Immediately after pointing to the right that we have over
our minds, Spinoza concedes that “a person’s judgment, admittedly, may
be subjected to another’s in many different and sometimes almost unbe-
lievable ways.”42 That is, even if we always retain some right over our
conscience, this right may be seriously limited by the power of others to
manipulate our beliefs. Spinoza’s apparently right-based defense of free-
dom of thought is thus not only devoid of normative force, it is also deeply
limited. Fortunately, this rather brief argument gives way to a battery of
other more effective arguments in favor of toleration to which I will now
turn.
2 the prudential, anticlerical basis of
spinoza’s tolerationism
We are now in a position to see the full force of the question with which
this chapter began. If toleration in general is puzzling, it is especially puz-
zling for someone like Spinoza. Why would one who never doubts the
correctness and universality of his own ethical and religious views, and
who eschews normative accounts of rights, be willing to tolerate activities
of which he disapproves? Why doesn’t Spinoza believe, as Berlin supposes
he does, that the sovereign should try to extirpate irrational and destruc-
tive behavior through legislative means? In this section we will consider
Spinoza’s thoroughly prudential reasons for opposing attempts to use laws
to make people virtuous (henceforth: “moral legislation”). But first let us
add one last wrinkle to the puzzle by noting that on certain matters Spinoza
was actually relatively intolerant.
40 TTP Ch. 20; G iii 239.
41 Waldron reads Locke as offering a similar argument for toleration (“Locke”).
42 TTP Ch. 20; G iii 239.
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2.1 Spinoza’s anticlerical intolerance
At the heart of Spinoza’s defense of toleration lies a deep anticlericalism.43
As we shall see it is a distrust of the moral crusades driven by the clergy
that underlies much of his general distrust of moral legislation. But before
turning to this, I want to consider the intolerant or illiberal features of
Spinoza’s anticlericalism.
In certain contexts, Spinoza was perfectly willing to countenance a
fair amount of intolerance. For instance, with respect to religious liberty,
Spinoza was hardly a liberal by contemporary standards.44 He argues quite
forcefully for the Erastian view that “authority in sacred matters belongs
wholly to the sovereign powers.”45 Religious injunctions acquire “the power
of law only by decree of those who exercise the right of government,”46 so
it devolves on the sovereign to make ultimate determinations in matters
of religion.47 The sovereign is, thus, the sole authority on both civil and
religious law. The rationale behind this claim is that piety must be under-
stood as practicing justice, and there is no standard of justice prior to and
independent of the will of the sovereign.48 Thus, Spinoza concludes, “no
one can rightly cultivate piety or obey God, without obeying edicts of the
sovereign authority.”49
It is only through curbing the power of the clergy that the sovereign
can protect the public from superstition and bigotry. In the preface to the
TTP, Spinoza warns the reader of zealots who “take the outrageous liberty
of trying to appropriate the greater part of this authority and utilize religion
to win the allegiance of the common people.”50 And Spinoza’s intolerant
attitude towards rabble-rousing religious figures reveals itself in even the
most tolerant sections of theTTP. When, in Chapter 20, Spinoza identifies
43 The first of his stated reasons for writing the TTP is to oppose “the prejudices of theologians. For I
know that these are the main obstacles which prevent men from giving their minds to philosophy”
(Ep. 30).
44 As many have noted, Spinoza’s toleration is not fundamentally a defense of the freedom of worship,
but rather of the freedom to philosophize. Jonathan Israel writes: “in Spinoza, freedom of worship,
far from constituting the core of toleration, is verymuch a secondary question . . . The gulf separating
Locke’s and Spinoza’s conceptions of toleration, originating in Locke’s concern for saving souls and
Spinoza’s for ensuring individual freedom, is thus widened further by Spinoza’s anxiety to whittle
down ecclesiastical power” (Radical Enlightenment, pp. 266–267).
45 TTP Ch. 19; G iii 228. 46 TTP Ch. 19; G iii 228.
47 TTP Ch. 16; G iii 199–200. The full passage reads: “it follows that the supreme right of deciding
about religion, belongs to the sovereign power, whatever judgment he may make, since it falls to
him alone to preserve the rights of the state and to protect them both by divine and by natural law”
(TTP Ch. 16; G iii 199).
48 TTP Ch. 19; G iii 229–230; cf. E4p37s2. 49 TTP Ch. 19; G iii 233. 50 TTP Preface; G iii 7.
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as seditious anyone who would challenge the authority of the sovereign,
or recognize an alternative authority,51 he evidently has in mind the very
zealots described in the preface. And just as it would be wise for the state
to “restrain the indignation and fury of the common people,”52 it seems
equally wise to limit the activities of religious leaders who promulgate
superstition and galvanize this anger.53
Understood in this light, we can agree with John Christian Laursen’s
claim thatmany of the illiberal features of Spinoza’s philosophy can actually
be understood as expressing underlying concern for toleration, since his
intolerance is, ultimately, an intolerance of intolerance.54 In order to protect
the freedom to philosophize we must curb the power of the religious
zealots who spread venomous superstition and persecute freethinkers. By
subordinating religious authority to civil authority, and “not allow[ing]
religious dogmas to proliferate,”55 Spinoza hopes to liberate the citizenry
from the destructive forces of fear and superstition.
This intolerance of clerical power and religious enthusiasm seems to lend
credence to Berlin’s assessment: Spinoza is seeking to remove obstacles to
rational thought through state interference. However, this misses much
of what is most important about Spinoza’s anticlericalism, which is that
it provides him not only with an argument for limited intolerance, but
also with a powerful argument for toleration. I want to turn now to the
anticlerical grounds for toleration.
2.2 Spinoza’s anticlerical toleration
One of the primary reasons why Spinoza is distrustful of moral legislation
is that, in general, such laws “are not made to restrain the ill-intentioned
so much as persecute well-meaning men,”56 and are promoted by hateful
zealots, rather than by compassionate, truth-loving individuals.57 Moral
legislation is advocated only by those who will not brook any challenge to
orthodoxy, i.e., those who are opposed to philosophical reflection and open
51 TTP Ch. 20; G iii 241–243. 52 TTP Ch. 20; G iii 244.
53 He claims that regulating beliefs is generally not necessary, except in a “corrupt” state, “where
superstitious and ambitious people who cannot tolerate free-minded persons, have achieved such
reputation and prominence that their authority exerts greater influence with the common people
than that of the sovereign powers” (TTP Ch. 20; G iii 242–243).
54 Laursen, “Spinoza on Toleration,” pp. 188, 191.
55 TTP Ch. 19; G iii 238. 56 TTP Ch. 20; G iii 244.
57 Michael Rosenthal has argued compellingly that, on Spinoza’s view, intolerance is a sign of a poor
character; a virtuous person, one possessed of fortitudo, or strength of character, will always act
mercifully, generously, and tolerantly (“Tolerance as a Virtue”).
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discussion. Spinoza reasonably suggests that these defenders of orthodoxy –
chiefly, religious enthusiasts – are the ones who ought to be constrained, not
the freethinkers: “the real schismatics are those who condemn other men’s
books and subversively instigate the insolent mob against their authors,
rather than the authors themselves, who for the most part write only for
the learned and consider reason alone as their ally.”58 So we should be very
leery about campaigns of intolerance because they are usually driven by
those who are corrupt and ignorant, and they often target the wise and the
good.
Spinoza, of course, had plenty of experience to fuel his distrust of
the intolerant. He was cast out of the Jewish community by an intol-
erant rabbinate.59 But perhaps more disturbing was the treatment of his
friend and fellow freethinker Adriaan Koerbagh at the hands of the magi-
strates. Koerbagh, who embraced many of the same metaphysical posi-
tions as Spinoza, including the view that God is identical with nature
and that everything is governed by the necessary laws of nature, was tried
and sentenced for blasphemy. While in prison under squalid conditions
Koerbagh fell ill; he died soon after being released. This affair is gener-
ally believed to have precipitated the completion and publication of the
TTP.60
Also, the conflict between the Arminians and orthodox Calvinists that
raged throughout the United Provinces in the first part of the seventeenth
century might also have inspired some of this distrust. From Spinoza’s
perspective, this dispute was a great object lesson about the source of intol-
erance. The peaceable Arminians regarded faith as primarily a matter of
conscience and thus were opposed to expanding the political position of
the Church.61 By contrast, the orthodox Calvinists, with their theocratic
ambitions, misunderstood the very nature of religion and religious author-
ity and sought to regulate civic affairs on the basis of these misguided
principles. After the Synod of Dort, in 1618, Arminians throughout the
United Provinces were removed from their offices and university posts.62
The Calvinist zealots in this case illustrated for Spinoza that “schisms do
58 TTP Ch. 20; G iii 246.
59 Perhaps his own experience lies behind his claim that the sovereign alone ought to have powers of
excommunication (TTP Ch. 19; G iii 235).
60 Nadler, Spinoza, p. 170.
61 See Nadler, Spinoza, p. 12. Jonathan Israel notes that “in his address on laying down the rectorship
of the university, at Leiden, in February 1606, Arminius condemned theological strife between
Christians as the worst of ills, a scourge nurturing doubt, atheism, and despair” (The Dutch
Republic, pp. 422–423).
62 Israel, The Dutch Republic, pp. 452ff.
222 justin steinberg
not arise from an intense passion for truth (which is the fount and origin
of amity and gentleness), but from a great lust for power.”63
Indeed, Spinoza’s entire account of the decline of the Hebrew common-
wealth (TTP, Chapter 18) can be read as a rather thinly veiled warning
about the effects of Calvinist fanaticism in the United Provinces. Accor-
dance to Spinoza’s account, when the priestly caste gained political power,
they not only destroyed peace, they also perverted religion. The final result
was inextinguishable conflict.64 Spinoza directly invites the reader here
to consider the degree to which the Calvinists of his time resemble the
Pharisees:
Following this example of the Pharisees, all the worst hypocrites everywhere have
been driven by the same frenzy (which they call zeal for God’s law), to perse-
cute men of outstanding probity and known virtue, resented by the common
people for precisely these qualities, by publicly reviling their opinions, and inflam-
ing the anger of the barbarous majority against them.65
One of the greatest reasons, then, for fearing moral legislation, Spinoza
suggests, is that it is the corrupt – e.g., the superstitious Pharisean Calvin-
ists – who lead the crusades against honest and honorable people (like
Koerbagh, Uriel Da Costa,66 and Arminius). It was the clergy who rec-
ommended extensive laws to reform men, including sumptuary laws to
prevent decadence and strict laws on blasphemy;67 such efforts at reform
were misguided and motivated by hatred and bigotry. This sociological
observation, however, does not give us much reason to oppose moral legis-
lation as such. Rather, it just gives us grounds for questioning themotives of
63 TTP Ch. 20; G iii 246. Spinoza offers the following dramatic story of religious corruption in the
preface to the TTP: “as soon as this abuse began in the church, the worst kind of people came
forward to fill the sacred offices and the impulse to spread God’s religion degenerated into sordid
greed and ambition. Churches became theatres where people went to hear ecclesiastical orators
rather than to learn from teachers. Pastors no longer sought to teach, but strove to win a reputation
for themselves while denigrating those who disagreed with them” (TTP Preface; G iii 8).
64 TTP Ch. 18; G iii 224. 65 TTP Ch. 18; G iii 225.
66 Da Costa, a member of the Sephardic Jewish community in Amsterdam, published a book entitled
Examination of Pharisaic Traditions [Exame das Tradic¸o˜es Phariseas], in which he denied the immor-
tality of the soul. The work was denounced by Sephardic elders and burned by local authorities.
He eventually committed suicide, just days after writing in his autobiography that the Amsterdam
magistrates allowed “the Pharisees” – i.e., his co-religionists – to persecute him. See Nadler, Spinoza,
pp. 66–74.
67 Sumptuary laws were often proposed by the clergy in the United Provinces, but rarely adopted.
Simon Schama writes that “the synod of Dordrecht in 1618 had urged the enactment of sumptuary
laws in restraint of extravagant entertainment, but as in so many matters, the message of the clergy
went unheeded by the magistracy” (Embarrassment of Riches, p. 186). Nevertheless, sumptuary laws
were introduced periodically, including in 1672 (concerning the size and lavishness of banquets),
prompting criticism from Spinoza (TP Ch. 10; G iii 355).
Spinoza’s curious defense of toleration 223
the enactors of this legislation. But Spinoza has a second form of argument
that deepens his critique of moral legislation.
2.3 Moral legislation as self-defeating
Even if it were the case that moralizing campaigns were led by virtuous
people against the genuinely dissolute, Spinoza would still be skeptical
about moral legislation on prudential grounds. As Parkinson puts it, on
Spinoza’s view, “an illiberal policy (Spinoza argues) would prevent the state
from functioning properly.”68 In fact, I think Spinoza’s claim is stronger
than this: it is not just the case that moral legislation undercuts the proper
functioning of the state – moral legislation undercuts its own aims. What
is moral legislation supposed to accomplish? The general goal is to make
people virtuous or pious. This is a perfectly noble objective in abstracto. If it
were the case that moral legislation effectively promotedmoral uprightness,
or, say, social cohesion, Spinozawould almost certainly support it.However,
he gives psychological and empirical reasons for believing that legislation
is an unsuitable tool for realizing such ends.
It might seem that moral legislation could promote cohesion by impos-
ing greater uniformity on the populous. The problem is that “there are
many men who are so constituted that there is nothing they would more
reluctantly put upwith than that the opinions they believe to be true should
be outlawed . . . they therefore proceed to reject the laws and act against
the magistrate. They regard it as very honourable and not at all shameful
to behave in a seditious manner.”69 Resistance to legislative interference
can be traced back to the affect of “ambition” [ambitio], which Spinoza
understands as the striving for others to approve of the same objects that
we do.70 Sometimes ambition will lead us to adjust our own judgments
to bring them in conformity with others’; however, more often than not,
we will seek to foist our views on others and oppose the efforts of others
to do the same to us. Because of our natural ambition, outlawing certain
expressions of belief will only further alienate offenders and deepen exist-
ing schisms. Moral legislation thus generally promotes disharmony and
treachery, rather than loyalty and cohesion.
Moral legislation also fails to make people more upright in their
dealings or more honest since if people were prohibited from express-
ing their true opinions, they “would be continually thinking one thing
68 Parkinson, “Spinoza on the Freedom of Man,” p. 53. 69 TTP Ch. 20; G iii 244.
70 See E3p29; cf. Rosenthal, “Spinoza’s Republican Argument,” and “Tolerance as a Virtue.”
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and saying something else. This would undermine the trust [fides]
which is the first essential of a state; detestable flatter and deceit would
flourish.”71 People cannot be expected to be morally upright and trustwor-
thy if they must devote so much effort to concealing their true beliefs.
Moral legislation will thus undercut honesty or uprightness rather than
promote it.
Indeed, it is not just cohesion and good faith that are undermined
by moral legislation, it is virtue in general: “trying to control everything
by laws will encourage vices rather than correcting them.”72 One can
attempt to make people virtuous or to prevent “extravagance . . . envy,
greed, drunkenness, and so on”73 by way of sumptuary laws,74 but in
fact such vices are only multiplied by legal intervention: “for all laws that
can be broken without injury to another become a laughing stock, and
far from restraining the desires and lusts of men, they even stimulate
them, because ‘we are ever eager for what is forbidden and desire what
is denied.’”75 Rather than making men more virtuous, rational, or loyal,
moral legislation actually serves to exacerbate the very ills that it aims to
prevent.
We have seen, then, that Spinoza’s defense of toleration is based on
two general claims: (1) the people who are most inclined to persecute the
beliefs or behaviors of others are generally among the most corrupt, so
we ought to be wary of acts of political intolerance, and (2) attempts
at perfecting others through the enactment of laws are generally self-
defeating.Many will regard Spinoza’s defense of toleration as unsatisfactory
on account of its prudential basis and its restricted scope.76 In the final
section we will further flesh out Spinoza’s defense of toleration by consid-
ering how it relates to the central norms of governance, suggesting how
71 TTP Ch. 20; G iii 243. 72 TTP Ch. 20; G iii 243.
73 TTP Ch. 20; G iii 243. 74 See supra note 67.
75 TP Ch. 10; G iii 355; cf. TTP Ch. 20; G iii 243. The quote comes from Ovid, Amores iii. iv, 17.
76 Some commentators regard Spinoza’s rejection of rights-claims as a fundamental weakness. For
instance, Feuer bemoans, “there are no reserved rights upon which the individual can insist . . . this
is the final weakness in Spinoza’s political theory; his doctrine pleads for wisdom but merges into
quiescence rather than deed” (Spinoza and the Rise of Liberalism, p. 114). Curley shares Feuer’s
frustration, though he appears less sanguine about the ultimate ground of rights than Feuer: “If we
cannot make sense of the idea that people have a natural right to such things, then we seem to be
handicapped in the criticism we want to make of the Roman conduct (or of a tyrant’s treatment
of his own people). That the notion of natural right (not coextensive with power) disappears in
Spinoza seems to me still to be a defect in his political philosophy, sympathetic though I may be to
the arguments which lead to that result” (“Kissinger, Spinoza, and Genghis Khan,” p. 335). Feuer
and Curley seem to be particularly distressed by the lack of a right of resistance, but Feuer explicitly
points also to the lack of a principled foundation in Spinoza’s defense of freedom of speech (Spinoza
and the Rise of Liberalism, p. 114).
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Spinoza’s pragmatism might actually be seen as a strength rather than a
weakness.
3 toleration and the ends of governance
At this point one might wonder about the precise limits and grounds of
Spinoza’s tolerationism. On the one hand, he argues that most acts of
intolerance or interference – even for the sake of some noble end – are
to be avoided because they are self-defeating. However, as we have seen,
Spinoza does allow for the regulation of outward religious activities to
protect the state from seditious and superstitious religious bigots. This
leads one to wonder what norm or principle is guiding the pragmatic
calculation that allows for toleration in some contexts but not others. To
answer this question wemust address more squarely what the guiding norm
of governance is, according to Spinoza.
Near the beginning ofTTP, Chapter 20, Spinoza claims that the purpose
of the state is to “enjoy the free use of reason, and not to participate in
conflicts based on hatred, anger or deceit or in malicious disputes with
each other. Therefore, the true purpose of the state is in fact freedom.”77
I have argued elsewhere that this notion of freedom is consistent with the
notion of freedom as one’s power of acting (potentia agendi) that one finds
in the Ethics. The state’s aim is to liberate or empower people as far as
it can.78 At other points in the political writings, Spinoza identifies the
primary aim of the state as welfare (salus),79 security (securitas),80 peace
(pax).81 Ultimately, I think that, contrary to appearances, these are in fact
different ways of describing the aim.82 The aim of the state is to bring
about, as far as possible, concord between citizens and mutual devotion to
the laws; this would be a condition of social flourishing that would in turn
redound to the power and liberty of individuals. Spinoza must ultimately
be claiming then that toleration, in many circumstances, contributes to
this aim.
Michael Rosenthal points to yet another norm that is served by tolera-
tion, namely, “stability.” Rosenthal’s argument is worth exploring briefly,
as it will, at once, enable us to see one reason why toleration is so
important for a well-functioning state, while also helping us to clarify
77 TTP Ch. 20; G iii 241. 78 Steinberg, “Spinoza on Civil Liberation.”
79 TTP Ch. 16; G iii 194; TTP Ch. 19; G iii 232; TP Ch. 3, art. 14; G iii 290; TP Ch. 7, art. 5; G iii
310.
80 TP Ch. 1, art. 5; G iii 275; TP Ch. 5, art. 2; G iii 295. 81 TP Ch. 5, art. 2; G iii 295.
82 Steinberg “Spinoza on Civil Liberation.”
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what a well-functioning state consists in. Rosenthal argues that toleration
contributes to the goal of stability by promoting participation, which, as I
understand Rosenthal’s view, is a constituent component of stability.83 The
success of this argument depends on how we understand the terms “par-
ticipation” and “stability.” If we understand “stability” simply in terms of
the ability for a state to persevere, it is not at all obvious that toleration is
the best policy for producing this goal. While Spinoza repeats Seneca’s dic-
tum that “no one has maintained a violent government for long” [violenta
imperia nemo continuit diu] twice in the TTP,84 he notes in the Tractatus
Politicus that “no state has stood so long without any notable change as that
of the Turks, and, conversely, none have proved so short-lived as popular
democratic states.”85 The oppressive Turks, who believe that “it is wicked
even to argue about religion,”86 were successful in using fear and awe to
restrain their subjects, which suggests that if the aim of the state is stability
in the sense of mere preservation, intolerance might well be expedient. But
as Spinoza makes very clear, the true end of the state consists not in mere
stability, but in peace, which “consists not in the absence of war but in
the union or harmony of minds.”87 Rosenthal, of course, recognizes that
the goal of the state is not mere self-preservation; by “stability” he means
something more like “peace” as defined above.88
The true end of the state, then, is to bring about peace, which is a
condition of flourishing that requires a relatively cohesive citizenry bound
by rational laws. How is this end promoted through toleration? Rosen-
thal’s answer is that toleration encourages participation, which is internally
connected to stability, or peace. In order for Rosenthal’s argument to be
successful “participation” must mean something more than formal involve-
ment in the governing process, since there is no reason why toleration
would lead to participation in this sense;89 nor is participation in this sense
a constituent component of peace. Rosenthal conceives of participation in
83 Rosenthal, “Spinoza’s Republican Argument,” pp. 333–335; cf. Rosenthal, “Tolerance as a Virtue,”
p. 549. Rosenthal wishes to maintain that participation and stability are not merely contingently
and instrumentally linked, for, if they were, the argument for toleration would be thoroughly
prudential, which is an interpretation that Rosenthal expressly disavows (“Spinoza’s Republican
Argument,” p. 320). Instead, participation must be intrinsically connected with stability, apparently
as a constituent component.
84 TTP Ch. 5; G iii 74; TTP Ch. 16; G iii 194. 85 TP Ch. 6, art. 4; G iii 298.
86 TTP Preface; G iii 7.
87 TP Ch. 6, art. 4; G iii 298. Cf. TP Ch. 5, arts. 4–5; G iii 296; TTP Ch. 17; G iii 219.
88 He explicitly connects stability with the positive freedom of the Ethics, “Spinoza’s Republican
Argument,” pp. 334–335.
89 Autocrats, of course, can and often did adopt policies of toleration without granting participatory
rights – for example, when Henry IV of France issued the Edict of Nantes in 1598, which protected
the practices of the Huguenots, he did not thereby democratize the kingdom in any sense.
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terms of one’s “active and continual transfer of right to the sovereign.”90 Put
simply, one could understand this notion of participation in terms of one’s
active commitment, or loyalty, to the state. The connection to peace should
be clear: the degree of civic commitment of the subjects will be directly
proportional to the degree of harmony or peace in the state. Moreover, this
also allows us to see why toleration will generally be more conducive to
participation than intolerance: preventing the beliefs or activities of others
will often breed resentment, which “lessens the desire of citizens to par-
ticipate in the government through the passive or active transfer of their
right/power [and hence] lessens the power of the government.”91
However, even with Rosenthal’s helpful argument in place, the question
that we set out to answer in this section remains. For even if toleration
generally conduces to participation and peace, we have seen that there are
cases when it does not. Consider the case of religious bigotry, once again.
Religious bigotry ought to be curbed not just because it threatens the
continued existence of the state, but also because it results in hostility,
resentment, and ignorance, all of which are anathema to peace. So even
if we can imagine a perseverant society run by bigots,92 this will not be
peaceful society. We can see, now, how complicated the sovereign’s task
is. Its primary directive is to promote peace. But peace requires not just
perseverance and the absence of war, it requires civil harmony and the
cultivation of reason.93 Under what conditions will toleration promote
peace? Here the sovereign will have to make sophisticated, and highly
circumstance-relative, pragmatic calculations.
To see just how circumstance-relative these judgments will be, consider
Spinoza’s insistence that good governance depends on regime form and
existing customs. What is good for a people accustomed to living in a
monarchy will differ from what is good for a people accustomed to living
in a democracy.94 And what is good for a people who are accustomed
90 Rosenthal, “Spinoza’s Republican Argument,” p. 335. There is, however, one problem for Rosenthal,
as I see it. Once we form a clearer understanding of what participation consists in, it becomes less
clear what makes this argument for toleration specifically republican. If participation is measured
in terms of the transfer of right to a sovereign or in terms of a citizenry’s devotion to the state, it is
no longer obvious that participation is a unique feature of republics. For a further discussion of the
relationship between republican participation and social flourishing, see Steinberg, “On Being Sui
Iuris.”
91 Rosenthal, “Spinoza’s Republican Argument,” p. 335.
92 Indeed, even a society of “rugged individualists,” in which there is very little commerce but also
very little enmity between individuals, would hardly qualify as harmonious or peaceful for Spinoza
(see, again, TP Ch. 5, art. 5; G iii 296).
93 See, again, TTP Ch. 20; G iii 241; TP Ch. 5, art. 5; G iii 296.
94 TTP Ch. 18; G iii 227–228.
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to oppression is different from what is good for a free people.95
The circumstance-relativity of governance is perhaps best illustrated by
Spinoza’s discussion of that shrewd statesman: Moses. Because the Hebrew
people were accustomed to slavery and not yet capable of self-rule, Moses
established a state religion that included a great number of laws – cere-
monial, dietary, etc. – that brought about social cohesion and efficiency –
that is, he introduced a great deal of moral legislation.96 Did such legisla-
tion backfire in the way that Spinoza supposes it would if adopted in the
United Provinces? On the contrary, these laws enabled a group of uned-
ucated nomads to live in relative material prosperity and peace. For these
men, accustomed as they were to obedience, such legislation “appeared to
be freedom rather than slavery.”97 And, whereas Spinoza reasons that, for
many, forbidding something only increases one’s desire for it,98 among the
Hebrews “no one could have desired what was forbidden, only what was
prescribed.”99 The major lesson that we can take away from the case of
Moses and the Hebrews here is simply that understanding the customs and
temperament of the subjects will go a long way in determining whether an
act of legislation will be peace-promoting.
So, when calculating whether a particular form of action will promote
or undermine peace, one must consider the receptiveness of subjects to
such legislation.100 This is an application of Spinoza’s general principle of
governance that one must conform one’s policies to the actual psycholog-
ical features of one’s subjects, rather than base them on an abstract and
idealized conception of human beings.101 When tailoring one’s policies to
the customs, temperaments, and proclivities of one’s subjects, one of the
most important considerations is how much freedom one’s subjects are
accustomed to. As Spinoza very astutely notes, “nothing is more difficult
than to deprive people of liberty once it has been granted.”102 TheHebrews,
accustomed as they were to obedience, were well-tempered to receive moral
95 “It remains only for me to remind the reader that the monarchy I here have in mind is one
established by a free people, for whom alone these suggestions can be helpful; for a people
accustomed to a different form of government will not be able to tear up the traditional foundations
of their state, changing its entire structure, without great danger of overthrowing the entire state”
(TP Ch. 7, art. 26; G iii 319).
96 TTP Ch. 5; G iii 74ff. 97 TTP Ch. 20; G iii 216. 98 TP Ch. 10, art. 5; G iii 355.
99 TTP Ch. 20; G iii 216.
100 The source of the command may also go a long way in determining how effective it is. Specifically,
moral commands are more grating and destabilizing when they come from religious figures than
when they come from the civil authority: “The prophets, who, of course, were private individuals,
had more success, it should be noted, in antagonizing than reforming people by means of the
liberty which they usurped to admonish, scold and rebuke; on the other hand, those admonished
or punished by kings, were readily corrected” (TTP Ch. 18; G iii 223; cf. TTP Ch. 19; G iii 236).
101 TP Ch.1, art. 1; G iii 273. 102 G iii 74.
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laws. However, a people who are accustomed to a wide range of liberties
are not likely to take well to new impositions on these liberties.
As noted above, many will regard the absence of a clear principle for
delimiting the scope of toleration as a weakness of Spinoza’s account.
However, the pragmatic, circumstance-relativity of Spinoza’s accountmight
actually be one of its virtues. Consider Spinoza’s approach in relation to
one of the bigger challenges for liberals today, namely, how far we should
tolerate hate speech, or speech that vilifies or degrades someone on the
basis of their identity (e.g., ethnicity, race, religion, etc.). Like religious
bigotry, hate speech may be seen as undermining peace by feeding the
zeal of the ignorant and allowing for the stigmatization of members of
groups that are often already vulnerable and marginalized. On the other
hand, there is some hope that, at least in a relatively enlightened society,103
permitting hate speech may actually strengthen the resolve of the citizenry
in opposing racism and bigotry; and, moreover, restricting speech may
well have the consequence of making people who are accustomed to broad
liberties more resentful of government. So how far should a sovereign that
wants to promote peace tolerate hate speech?
Spinoza would argue that we cannot reasonably take a principled, once-
and-for-all, stance on how far such speech ought to be admitted – to do
so would be not only naı¨ve, it would be dangerous. Instead, one would
have to consider the receptivity of the citizenry to the regulation of such
speech, how much general discord is likely to be wrought by the admission
of such speech, and how vulnerable the target group is.104 In countries
where there is a dominant ethos of liberty – i.e., where people are accus-
tomed to a very tolerant state with minimal intervention – the regulation
of hate speech might be more destabilizing or disharmonizing than it
would be in countries where there is, say, a dominant ethos of fraternity.105
While such circumstance-relativity may well lead to complicated legislative
103 EvenMill claims that the harm principle only applies to those societies that have achieved a certain
level of “maturity” and enlightenment (On Liberty, p. 11).
104 See Waldron (“Free Speech”) for a helpful discussion of the topic.
105 In other words, Spinoza’s approach might be able to account for some of the differences
between the USA and many other Western countries on the issue of hate speech regula-
tion. In the USA, where a certain reading of the first amendment, bolstered by some judicial
interpretations, has led many to hold freedom of speech as sacrosanct, there may be reason
to be more cautious about regulating hate speech than in other Western countries that do
regulate hate speech – such as Canada, France, Germany, and the Scandinavian countries –
where there is, arguably, a greater concern for fraternity and a less fetishized attitude towards free
speech and so less resistance to such legislation. One concern, however, with seeking to accom-
modate the customs and psychology of one’s citizens is that this would lead to an approach that is
too conservative, too acquiescent to prevailing opinions.
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determinations, given the complexity of the phenomena, perhaps a little
messiness is to be expected.
Let me close by just calling attention to one final, important feature of
Spinoza’s account. There is a tendency to associate defenses of toleration
and liberalism with the adoption of a certain conception of civil liberty,
namely, negative liberty, or the freedom of non-interference. But, as we
have seen, it is not the norm of liberty as non-interference that is driving
Spinoza’s defense of toleration, but rather the norms of peace and positive
liberty. In his defense of toleration, Spinoza demonstrates that liberalism
is not wedded to any particular conception of liberty. One can perfectly
consistently endorse both the view that the ultimate goal of the state is to
promote positive liberty or power and the view that legislation is generally
ineffective in promoting this liberty.106 The failure to see the consistency of
these two views might well have been what led Berlin to overlook Spinoza’s
tolerationism. For those of us, though, who are generally sympathetic to
tolerationism, but who do not regard freedom from interference on its
own as a particularly robust political norm, Spinoza’s ability to reconcile
positive liberty with a relatively tolerant state may be seen as one of his
greatest accomplishments.
106 In recent years, a similar position has been advanced by Joseph Raz. After defending a positive
model of freedom – freedom as autonomy – and claiming that the state has a duty both to prevent
deprivations of this liberty and to promote it actively (Morality of Freedom, p. 424), Raz notes
that the government’s ability to foster such liberty may be rather limited, adopting a pragmatic
line very much like Spinoza’s: “The extended freedom from governmental action is based on the
practical inability of governments to discharge their duty to serve the [positive] freedom of their
subjects . . . The pursuit of full-blooded perfectionist policies, even of those which are entirely
sound and justified, is likely in many countries if not all, to backfire by arousing popular resistance
leading to civil strife” (Morality of Freedom, pp. 428–429).
